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Abstract
Background: In an effort to reduce the increasing number of persons with mental illness (PMI) experiencing incarceration,
co-responding police-mental health teams are being utilized as a way to divert PMI from the criminal justice system. Co-
response teams are typically an inter-agency collaboration between police and mental health professionals, and in some
cases include emergency medical personnel. These teams are intended to facilitate emergency response by linking patients
to mental health resources rather than the criminal justice system, thus reducing burdens on both the criminal
justice systems as well as local healthcare systems. The current study examines the barriers and facilitators of
successfully implementing the Mobile Crisis Assistance Team model, a first-responder co-response team consisting of
police officers, mental health professionals, and paramedics. Through content analysis of qualitative focus groups with
team members and interviews with program stakeholders, this study expands previous findings by identifying additional
professional cultural barriers and facilitators to program implementation while also exploring the role of clear, systematic
policies and guidelines in program success.
Results: Findings demonstrate the value of having both flexible and formal policies and procedures to help guide
program implementation; ample community resources and treatment services in order to successfully refer clients to
needed services; and streamlined communication among participating agencies and the local healthcare community. A
significant barrier to successful program implementation is that of role conflict and stigma. Indeed, members of the co-
response teams experienced difficulty transitioning into their new roles and reported negative feedback from other first
responders as well as from within their own agency. Initial agency collaboration, information sharing between agencies,
and team building were also identified as facilitators to program implementation.
Conclusion: The current study provides a critical foundation for the implementation of first-responder police-mental
health co-response teams. Cultural and systematic barriers to co-response team success should be understood prior to
program creation and used to guide implementation. Furthermore, attention must be directed to cultivating community
and professional support for co-response teams. Findings from this study can be used to guide future efforts to implement
first-response co-response teams in order to positively engage PMI and divert PMI from the criminal justice system.
Keywords: Persons with mental illness, Co-response teams, Implementation, Police, mental health emergency response,
Pre-arrest diversion, Mobile crisis teams, Urban
* Correspondence: marybail@iu.edu
1Center for Health & Justice Research, Indiana University Public Policy
Institute, 334 N. Senate Avenue, Suite 300, Indianapolis, IN 46204, USA
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Health and Justice
© The Author(s). 2018 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Bailey et al. Health and Justice            (2018) 6:21 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s40352-018-0079-0
Background
Since the 1970’s, persons with mental illness (hereafter re-
ferred to as “PMI”) have been managed precipitously by
the criminal justice system. One of the commonly cited
reasons for the mismanagement of PMI in justice settings
is the process of deinstitutionalization that began in the
1950’s. Before this time, the national inpatient rate was ap-
proximately three times higher than the national incarcer-
ation rate (Raphael & Stoll, 2013). Incarceration outpaced
institutionalization in the mid 1970’s, and this gap became
increasingly large following the exponential growth in in-
carceration rates through the 1980’s and 1990’s (Raphael
& Stoll, 2013). Today, PMI are three times more likely to
be in jail or prison than in a hospital receiving appropriate
treatment (Taheri, 2016). Scholars do not know exactly
how many incarcerated individuals suffer from mental ill-
ness, but estimates range from 14% to as many as 50%
(Steadman, Osher, Robbins, Case, & Samuels, 2009; Bron-
son, & Berzofsky, 2017).
Given the prevalence of PMI, local jurisdictions have
started implementing programs aimed at reducing un-
necessary arrest and incarceration and linking this popu-
lation to community-based treatment and supports.
Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) is an example of this
kind of program for police officers; the CIT curriculum
includes a myriad of topics related to behavioral health
and substance abuse as well as police officer liability,
policies and procedures, and equipment (Dupont,
Cochran, & Pillsbury, 2007; Compton, Bahora, Watson,
& Oliva, 2008). However, many jurisdictions see CIT as
part of a broader “pre-booking” approach to addressing
police-PMI relations in the community and have collab-
orated with local community healthcare providers to
create another type of “pre-booking” diversion referred
to as co-responding police-mental health teams. These
teams typically involve partnering a sworn police officer
with a mental health or substance abuse professional
(Shapiro et al., 2014). Thus, co-response teams go be-
yond training police officers by integrating officers with
trained professionals who specialize in behavioral health
problems.
The present study provides insight into the barriers
and facilitators of implementing a co-response team in
Indianapolis, Indiana, a metropolitan city in the Mid-
west. This co-response model, the Mobile Crisis Assist-
ance Team (MCAT), provides a coordinated team
response by police, paramedics, and master’s level be-
havioral health clinicians to emergency calls for service
involving PMI. In order to study and document program
implementation, the MCAT program was piloted in a
single Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department
(IMPD) between August 1 and December 9, 2017. Re-
searchers collected qualitative data interviews and focus
groups with members of the MCAT (police, paramedics,
and clinical social workers) as well as agency stake-
holders who developed and implemented the program
throughout the first 4 months of the program. In tran-
scribing and coding these interviews we identify themes
around implementation of the MCAT and link these
findings back to the literature on co-response teams to
inform future efforts in developing similar integrated in-
teragency collaboration models.
Police responses to mental illness
One of the most prevalent specialized police strategies
to address PMI been CIT, wherein police officers are
trained about mental illness and how to respectfully and
safely interact with PMI (Dupont, Cochran, & Pillsbury,
2007; Compton, Bahora, Watson, & Oliva, 2008). The
original CIT program was established in 1998 by Mem-
phis Police Department in response to the police shoot-
ing of a PMI in crisis (Compton et al., 2008). The main
goal of CIT is to divert PMI away from the criminal just-
ice system into responsive mental health services (Wat-
son, Ottati, Morabito, Draine, Kerr, & Angell, 2010).
Studies on the effectiveness of CIT have been generally
positive (Compton, et al., 2008); however, some research
indicates that arrest rates are similar between CIT and
non-CIT trained officers, and that positive effects seen
are the result of CIT officers referring PMIs to treatment
who would have otherwise just been “contacted” but not
actually arrested (Watson et al., 2010). This suggests that
CIT may be only part of a broader “pre-booking” ap-
proach to addressing police-PMI relations in the
community.
Recognizing that CIT may just be a part of the solution
to managing PMI calls for service, many police depart-
ments have collaborated with local community healthcare
providers to create another type of “pre-booking” diver-
sion, generally referred to as co-responding police-mental
health teams (Shapiro et al., 2015). Many terms are used
to refer to co-response teams; these include: mobile crisis
intervention teams, crisis outreach and support teams, or
ambulance and clinical early response teams. Generally
speaking, teams involve a sworn police officer who is part-
nered with a mental health or substance abuse profes-
sional. In some instances, co-response teams also
integrate a medical professional (such as a nurse or para-
medic) or a peer specialist (such as an individual in recov-
ery from mental illness or substance use disorder) (Hay,
2015). Co-response teams are built on the premise that
“the more police and mental health workers collaborate,
the better the two systems can serve consumers” (Rosen-
baum, 2010). Teams usually have several common goals,
including diverting PMI from the criminal justice system,
increasing consumer access to mental health and sub-
stance abuse treatment, de-escalating crises and prevent-
ing injuries, and reducing pressures on the criminal
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justice and healthcare systems, all while remaining cost ef-
fective and accountable (Steadman et al., 2001; Shapiro et
al., 2014). Co-response teams also differ in several import-
ant ways, both in terms of the responses they provide and
the populations they serve. For example, some teams pro-
vide an immediate crisis response. That is, they arrive at
the scene of a crisis after a call for service has been placed
and proceed to operate as first responders, with the assist-
ance of a clinician, social worker, or emergency medical
technician. Other types of teams operate as a
post-response (or second responders) and arrive after an
initial first response has occurred.
The prevalence of police-mental health co-response
team implementation in the United States is unknown;
in Canada, estimates suggest that these joint teams are
the “predominant mobile response” to mental health cri-
ses (Kean, Bornstein, & Mackey, 2012). This is concern-
ing, given that there is only a limited amount of research
on co-response teams, especially in terms of outcomes
and essential components for implementation (Forchuk,
Jensen, Martin, Csiernik, & Atyeo, 2010; Boscarato, Lee,
Kroschel, Hollander, Brennan, & Warren, 2014). Puntis
(2018) and colleagues conducted a systematic review of
the literature on co-responder models of police mental
health triage, finding nine studies on models based in
the United States of 23 total studies identified. The au-
thors acknowledge a lack of literature in this field, par-
ticularly regarding model description and fidelity
indicators that lead to good practice as well as patient
outcomes. However, preliminary research suggests that
co-response teams are generally able to attend more cri-
sis runs than regular officers at reduced response times
(Baess, 2005; Kisely et al., 2010; Department of Health
and Human Services, Victoria, 2012); make fewer arrests
and reduce time first responders spend on managing cri-
sis scenes (Lamb, Shaner, Elliot, Decuir, & Foltz, 1995;
Steadman, Deane, Borum, & Morrissey, 2000; Baess,
2005; Kisely et al., 2010; Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, Victoria, 2012; Shapiro et al., 2014); and
minimize burdens on local medical systems by directing
fewer crises to emergency care (Baess, 2005; Department
of Health and Human Services, Victoria, 2012) and state
hospitals (Scott, 2000), suggesting the possibility of
cost-effectiveness (Scott, 2000; Rosenbaum, 2010; De-
partment of Health and Human Services, Victoria,
2012). However, several barriers to the development and
implementation of a co-response program have been
identified. Findings from these studies suggest that the
positive outcomes described above are dependent on
several factors, including adequate staffing and vehicles
(Baess, 2005), sufficient team member cross-training
(Baess, 2005), a centralized location for more rapid
dispatch (Steadman et al., 2000), and access to pertinent
medical and criminal histories about the PMI served
(Baess, 2005; Hartford et al., 2006; Shapiro et al., 2014;
Kirst et al., 2015). Additionally, there were recurring is-
sues with role clarity and differences in professional cul-
tures between team members, contributing to
implementation difficulties (Kirst et al., 2015; Council of
State Governments, 2018).
The current study
A special report for the Mayor of Indianapolis released
in October 2016 found that the county’s jail capacity
numbers were at a “critical” level, to the extent that
some individuals arrested in Marion County were being
held in a county jail approximately 160miles from In-
dianapolis (BKD, 2016). In response to jail overcrowding
and a substantial increase in the jail population between
2015 and 2016, the Mayor formed a task force to study
and generate actionable items for reform of the city’s
criminal justice system in order to reduce the number of
incarcerated individuals. Among other initiatives, the re-
form plan resulted in the creation of the MCAT pilot
program, a co-responding police-mental health team
model with the addition of a medical professional. The
development of this program was in response to the
large numbers of incarcerated PMI nationally, and the
fact that PMI are more likely than the general popula-
tion to be jailed. In the case of MCAT, an IMPD officer
partnered with both an Eskenazi Health Midtown (Mid-
town) mental health clinician and an Indianapolis Emer-
gency Medical Services (IEMS) paramedic. Each agency
identified a coordinator within its leadership to design
and implement the MCAT program in concert. These
official coordinators developed and implemented train-
ing, identified potential team members from their re-
spective agencies, and made procedural and logistical
decisions with support from the Indianapolis Office of
Public Health and Safety. The primary objective of the
MCAT pilot was to divert time-consuming, challenging,
and complicated pre-arrest situations to a dedicated,
specially trained team that could engage, assess, and
route individuals to mental health and social services in-
stead of the criminal justice system.
MCAT team members completed approximately 320 h
of training together, reviewing topics such as behavioral
health, use of force and de-escalation, and legal implica-
tions of interagency collaboration among other topics.
MCAT teams began responding to crises on August 1,
2017 in a single Indianapolis police district covering ap-
proximately 50 mile2. This district was selected due to
its high Social Disorder Index ranking and high rates of
mental/emotional 911 calls and ambulance runs for
medical emergencies. Four MCAT units were formed for
the pilot project, each working in 12-h shifts, resulting
in 24/7 MCAT availability. MCAT members had unique
uniforms identifying them as both MCAT personnel and
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members of their respective agencies. The teams oper-
ated out of a non-emergent van with an MCAT logo on
the outside. Each team member utilized his or her own
laptop to access necessary agency-specific information,
although information was shared between team mem-
bers to facilitate contact and treatment. The roles of
MCAT team members were fluid to allow dynamic re-
sponses to crises but, generally, the police officer en-
sured security at the scene; the clinician facilitated
mental health assessments and treatment linkage; and
the paramedic addressed any medical issues, checked pa-
tient vitals, and performed assessments related to sub-
stance use symptoms when necessary. Importantly—and
distinct from other co-response teams—the MCAT
served primarily as a first responder unit, not a
post-response unit. Thus, the MCAT responded to the
scene of a crisis at the request of other first responders,
or self-dispatched upon hearing of a relevant crisis via IMPD
or IEMS dispatch radio. However, when available, MCATalso
conducted follow-ups with individuals they previously en-
countered to encourage linkage with services. By the conclu-
sion of the pilot in December 2017, MCAT responded to a
total of 566 emergency calls for service with a range of 1 to 11
responses per day. MCAT teams self-dispatched in nearly
two-thirds (63%) of runs, while the rest of the runs (35%) were
primarily in response to specific requests for help from IMPD.
A mental health emergency was the most common event to
which MCAT responded, with 59% of runs involving PMI.
The second and third most common emergencies to which
MCAT responded were overdose or substance abuse related
and self-harm related (35% and 34% respectively).
Method
Qualitative data were collected from two sources dur-
ing the first 4 months of the pilot period: focus
groups with MCAT members and one-on-one
semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders.
Three members of the research team conducted two
semi-structured focus groups with members of the
MCAT units. Each focus group consisted of two
teams (six MCAT members in each focus group, n =
12) and lasted approximately 2 hours each. These
focus groups captured the entire population of
line-level staff involved in the MCAT effort. A
semi-structured guide was used to facilitate these
focus groups, allowing for probing, clarification, and
contextualization when appropriate (see Appendix 1).
The primary goal of focus groups was to understand
frontline staff perspectives on implementation, includ-
ing any perceived barriers or facilitators to successful
MCAT operation. A consensus meeting was held after
each focus group among research team members and
meetings were transcribed. One author conducted in-
terviews with MCAT program developers and stake-
holders, which included personnel from IMPD, IEMS,
the Indianapolis Department of Public Health &
Safety, and Midtown (n = 9) (see Table 1). A
semi-structured protocol was used to administer these
interviews and focused on program development and
implementation, including perceived barriers and fa-
cilitators to these processes (see Appendix 2). Each
interview lasted approximately 1 hour. All of the in-
terviews were audio recorded and transcribed.
Table 1 Interview participants
Stakeholder Agency Stakeholder Title Primary Role in MCAT Implementation
IMPD Chief IMPD buy-in and support of high-level cross-agency collaboration
IMPD Executive Officer Oversight of day-to-day MCAT implementation and operation -
supervisor of MCAT officers
IMPD Commander of IMPD East
District
Commander of East District police district where MCAT program
was piloted. Facilitated cooperation between MCAT and East
District officers.
IEMS Chief IEMS buy-in and support of high-level, cross-agency collaboration
IEMS Public Safety Liaison Director Oversight of day-to-day MCAT implementation and operation –
supervisor of MCAT IEMS personnel
Midtown Clinical Supervisor Oversight of day-to-day MCAT implementation and operation -
supervisor of MCAT clinical personnel
Midtown Crisis Specialist With experience on other police/mental health co-response
follow-up initiatives, guided development of MCAT model
and training
Midtown Emergency Department
Physician
Receives MCAT patients
Indianapolis Office of Public Health and
Safety
Director Implementation of Mayor’s public health and safety reform initiatives
including MCAT - coordinate public safety agencies and collaboration
with Midtown.
Bailey et al. Health and Justice            (2018) 6:21 Page 4 of 12
Analytic strategy
Transcribed qualitative data were reviewed and independ-
ently coded by three members of the research team. Cod-
ing followed a grounded theory approach (Strauss and
Corbin 1998; Charmaz 2001) in which researchers looked
at general patterns in the data and then proceeded to
identify coding categories. Using directed content analysis
to focus the research findings (Weber, 1990; Hsieh &
Shannon, 2005), coders classified emergent themes within
the broad categories of “barriers” and “facilitators” to
MCAT development and implementation. To establish
initial inter-rater agreement, researchers independently
coded three qualitative data sources using NVivo qualita-
tive analysis software (v.10, QSR International 2014). Then
the research team met to discuss emerging themes that
originated from the pilot round of coding and collabora-
tively developed a final coding procedure for all of the
qualitative sources. Coders agreed upon categorical titles
to describe each common theme (referred to as “nodes” or
“cases” in NVivo) and discarded themes that were not cor-
roborated by all three coders. Where coding categories
slightly differed amongst researchers, these were discussed
with the full research team and, through intersubjective
agreement, were folded into broader conceptual categor-
ies. For example, a “technology” child node under the
mother node of “facilitators” was folded into the broader
category of “information sharing.” Upon individually cod-
ing all qualitative materials using the agreed upon coding
procedures, researchers met a final time to review and es-
tablish final categorical titles for the major themes
gleaned. Major themes reported here are those independ-
ently identified by all three coders and include topics re-
ported by four or more stakeholders from at least two
different agencies across the three sets of qualitative data
collection. Frequencies were computed for each coding
category and source using NVivo.
Results
Table 2 provides a list and brief description of the bar-
rier and facilitator related themes that emerged during
the coding process. Below we outline each of these
themes in greater detail and provide examples from the
data that illustrate the specific barrier or facilitator.
Policies and procedures
The MCAT was established as a pilot program with little
oversight or guidance in how teams would operate.
While this flexibility allowed team members to continu-
ously learn and adjust to real-time needs in the commu-
nity, a lack of clear direction sometimes led to
confusion, variation in crisis response, and frustration
among the teams. As one team member noted,
“We need a clear mission statement; we don’t know
whether we’re supposed to be responding to certain runs
or not. Right now, we’re all taking different approaches
to these calls. What is our role supposed to be? Because
I don’t think we have a clearly defined role.”
However, MCAT leadership was hesitant to limit the
ways in which units could respond; preferring instead
for discretion with the understanding that the pilot pro-
gram would reveal the ways in which MCAT could be
most useful. As one leader explained, “We didn’t want
to make everything black and white for them, because
we want them to keep thinking. To make decisions on
their own.” Another leader described what would
Table 2 Barriers and Facilitators of MCAT Implementation
Barriers Description
Policies and Procedures A lack of clear policies and procedures led to confusion and
inconsistency among MCAT units.
External Coordination MCAT stakeholders fell short of successfully coordinating
with outside agencies service the same population.
Treatment Resources A lack of local treatment facilities complicated diversion
into treatment.
Role Conflict and Stigma Some MCAT members struggled transitioning into their
new roles on a collaborative, mental health-focused team.
Oversight of day-to-day MCAT implementation and operation –
supervisor of MCAT IEMS personnel
Facilitators
Initial Citywide Collaboration and Buy In MCAT implementation was bolstered by multiple city
agencies who collaborated closely to develop the program.
Information Sharing Triangulation of MCAT consumer information was integral
to the program’s operations.
Team Building Team building exercises during initial training laid a solid
foundation for three person teams going forward.
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happen if the pilot program was rolled out with strict
policies and procedures already in place,
“I think putting too many bright line rules would
probably be detrimental to it. Because then it’s like
when you have these bright line rules and officers are
held accountable to these rules and they could get in
trouble and the way you don’t get in trouble is to not
deal with it at all… and we don’t want that.”
External communication
Inter-agency communication can be difficult when com-
bining multiple agencies into one emergency response ini-
tiative, particularly around the topics of mental health and
substance use. IMPD, IEMS, and Midtown experienced
learning pains in establishing internal communication
protocols and sharing or coordinating resources; however,
communicating and coordinating MCAT goals and re-
sponsibilities with external actors in the community was a
more salient barrier to implementation. For example, sev-
eral team members expressed frustration at being asked
who they were and being confused with other agencies in
the area doing similar work, stating, “People don’t know
who MCAT is or what they do.” Participants described a
host of examples of how other first responders struggled
to understand their role: “Firefighters make comments
like, ‘No one else does it like this’, and that’s frustrating.”
Team members lamented there was no dedicated liaison
to communicate MCAT’s role, stating, “It’d be nice if
higher ups could go to places out in the community and
introduce MCAT, explain what we do.”
MCAT leadership acknowledged that operations were
not adequately publicized or well integrated into the
local network of first responders. These disconnects
were especially prominent between officers and other
agencies’ first responders. One leader conceded,
“[MCAT leadership] probably could have
communicated it a little better amongst supervisors
and officers… so they had a better idea. There was a
little confusion about what the responsibilities were.
And there were officers that really didn’t know the
[MCAT teams] were out there.”
Similar statements were made regarding MCAT coord-
ination with community healthcare providers outside of
MCAT partner Midtown. MCAT members were
skeptical of that their roles were clearly communicated
to the hospitals they work with, stating, “[Key stake-
holders] should have met with other hospitals before the
MCAT program started because they need to know who
we are and why we’re bringing in patients.” Others
agreed, “Most people don’t even know what MCAT is,
so I don’t even think that most [doctors] would realize
that their patient was brought by MCAT to the emer-
gency department.”
There was also a perceived need to better market
MCAT operations to the public in order to differentiate
this program from other initiatives that serve the same
populations. One stakeholder explained that other com-
munity initiatives had misconceptions about what MCAT
would and would not do which led to miscommunication.
Several MCAT leaders and stakeholders explained and
gave examples of this lack of coordination. For instance,
existing public safety programs to assist with homeless
outreach, emergency crisis follow-up and mental health
interventions were not incorporated into the MCAT plan-
ning process or implementation, although these efforts
serve similar populations to those of MCAT.
Across these subthemes of external communication, it
is clear that MCAT operations were not well coordi-
nated with or communicated to other first responders,
healthcare providers, or other strategic initiatives in op-
eration across the city.
Treatment services
The difficulties presented by a lack of treatment services
for program consumers surfaced multiple times
throughout the research literature on co-response teams
(Lamb et al., 1995; Scott, 2000; Steadman et al., 2000;
Steadman et al., 2001; Ratansi, 2004; Baess, 2005; Hart-
ford et al., 2006; Saunders & Marchik, 2007; Kisely et al.,
2010; Rosenbaum, 2010; Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, Victoria, 2012; Kirst et al., 2015), and un-
fortunately this barrier existed for the MCAT as well.
One MCAT stakeholder stated,
“This is the biggest fear for me; you do all of this work
on the front end, but there are no real services on the
back end, so these people aren’t getting the help, because
there are not enough beds or mental health professionals
that will work with them, or they don’t have insurance.”
Addressing the needs of populations with behavioral
health and co-occurring substance use issues goes well be-
yond responding to crises and seeking to find avenues for
diversion. MCAT team members provide referrals, guide
individuals to resources, or transport patients to a hospital
or other crisis center, but this does not guarantee that in-
dividualized treatment needs will be met. Treatment ser-
vices may not be accessible and in some instances may
simply not exist. Another MCAT stakeholder grimly sug-
gested, “The city was under the impression that there are
places to take people; there are not.”
The lack of available outpatient treatment services led
participants to rethink the initial build-out of the MCAT
program. Rather than emphasizing relationship building
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across agencies and delivering training to teams as one
of the initial steps to planning the implementation of the
MCAT program, stakeholders wished more effort would
have been placed on inventorying and expanding treat-
ment services. As a MCAT stakeholder suggested,
“If we are talking about launching this in a thoughtful
way in other places, then making sure that treatment
resources are available [is crucial]. You sort of have to
work backwards: if you’re going to go out and find
people who need help, you probably want to have that
help available.”
Another leader seconded this view, proposing that,
“A lot of time and effort and money is being spent on
innovative programs when really probably a lot more
time and effort and energy should be spent building
the capacity of our behavioral health system to take
care of people.”
Limited treatment resources also have the potential to
foster frustration and burnout for team members. One
MCAT team member expressed exasperation, stating,
“People come out of [the hospital] not making changes
because they were just given a pamphlet, not services.”
Unfortunately, addressing these issues requires bolster-
ing a broader system of behavioral health care beyond
the purview of co-response teams, follow-up units,
emergency departments, or first responders.
Role conflict and stigma
Police officers and paramedics had a difficult time tran-
sitioning from traditional responsibilities to new roles in
a special unit and experienced stigma and negative feed-
back from within their respective agencies. For example,
several team members recounted struggles with other
police officers, stating, “[Other officers say] we’re jokes
now; we aren’t the real police”. Other team members ex-
plained experiencing similar issues with the fire depart-
ment: “Firefighters have been particularly resistant to
understand what we do.” One team member suggested
that emergency services was problematic, as well: “Every
ambulance I’ve run into thinks we are there to do their
legwork.” As a result, some MCAT members had diffi-
culty adjusting to the new identity that was placed upon
them. As one clinician explained, “Three different people
with three different roles do one job now, not exactly
the job they used to do. In a way, you’re giving up your
expertise in the spirit of collaboration.”
This difficulty was most prominently manifested in
concern about the MCAT uniforms, especially when it
came to police officers. As officers explained, “There is
honor in your uniform and this MCAT uniform is a
halfway-police officer uniform.” One officer stated, “Be-
ing clearly identified as a police officer is important to
me. Being clearly identified is important for all the roles.
I’ve been mistaken for animal control, a mall cop, and
Brinks.” Another officer confided, “My biggest hang-up
is still the uniform. I want to be more clearly identified
as a police officer, and if that is not addressed in the pro-
gram, it could make or break my decision to stay on the
team.”
Leadership anticipated that the transition to a new,
non-traditional service role would contribute to team
member dissatisfaction. One leader explained how this
experience might be affecting officers on teams:
“One of the most difficult things is coming out of
what they are normally doing... They have all been on
the street... so I think that’s an adjustment for them.
Any time law enforcement leaves the first position
(street officer)… it’s often difficult to make that
transition.”
Leadership also recounted specific issues from the be-
ginning of the pilot,
“There was a lot of pressure and push back, just
culturally within the organization. Oh, why are you
going to a special unit? What are you even going to
be doing? And [officers] couldn’t really answer that...
It takes a certain type of officer with a lot of self-
confidence and an open mind.”
Despite the stigma that officers were experiencing,
leadership insisted that the MCAT uniforms served a
very specific function related to the population that
MCAT serves. An MCAT stakeholder explained,
“There is a different reaction to [a police officer] in a
uniform… They aren’t going to talk to me as much as
they would you about their mental health or their
drug abuse. And so, my guess is that’s the reason and
that would be the pushback I think to go back to their
regular uniforms.”
MCAT leadership and stakeholders hold that the
MCAT’s more neutral appearance, despite team member
misgivings, is critical to the unit’s behavioral health
agenda. These themes also demonstrate strains between
MCAT leadership and team members who may have dif-
ferent perspectives on how the MCAT program should
operate.
Initial agency collaboration
The City of Indianapolis was largely responsible for
spearheading the MCAT pilot program and had
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previously coordinated efforts between public safety
agencies and mental health providers. As one MCAT
stakeholder explained,
“I think what made it easier is that Marion County
has had a long lasting relationship… even before
[MCAT], we had a good relationship with medical
services here, a good relationship with Eskenazi, a
good relationship with mental health workers. So,
from the top down, so there had been a lot of history
and a lot of associations with, um, individuals who
have thought the same way.”
Respondents especially praised support from the
Mayor’s Office, explaining how it provided a platform
for resource negotiation and agency accountability. An-
other stakeholder described his experience during
MCAT development similarly:
“It has to start from the top down because this is an
ask from everybody... There has to be a return on
investment for everybody involved that’s not
money...So we have all of these different moving parts,
and when you put the leadership together in a
collaborative way, and these folks all want to solve the
same problem, we can sort of understand, ‘Okay, I can
lose over here if I win over here.”
MCAT was able to take advantage of already-existing
synergies between agencies to bring agency representa-
tives to the table and initiate dialogue to build the
MCAT program. Leadership was open to leaving their
agency “silos” to tackle shared problems and had experi-
ence working with one another. Further, the high-profile
status of the program and support from city-county gov-
ernment may have helped to alleviate initial resource
equity concerns.
Information sharing
One of the most salient facilitators of implementation
noted by MCAT members and stakeholders was the
ability to share information within the bounds of regula-
tory and legal mandates. MCAT units believed their “tri-
angulation” of agency information resources results in a
greater ability to locate, serve, and follow-up with a spe-
cific patient in and after the moment of crisis. Multiple
stakeholders throughout the evaluation expressed the
importance of information triangulation, and how “com-
bining the systems and software of three agencies creates
a powerful tool” for the MCAT.
Upon dispatching to the scene of an emergency, offi-
cers and clinicians can independently and respectively
compare criminal justice and healthcare records on their
laptops to better prepare the team for response. This
triangulation helps teams anticipate potential hazards
and allows them to reconnect patients with treatment
services they may have received in the past. As one
MCAT team member explained,
“We can look at [a situation] from multiple different
angles. We typically try to do our homework when we
go out and see somebody, especially if we have a
name ahead of time… The police officer will go and
look at what their record is. Our clinician can look to
see if they are in the Midtown system, to see if they
have been there before... and then from the medical
side we can see... how many times they have called in
the past few years and now we are putting together a
better picture on things.”
An MCAT stakeholder noted the difference these in-
formation systems make on operations, particularly not-
ing new abilities to directly observe the sequential
outcome of their intervention:
“There is a Midtown clinician that...is able to link [a
patient] back to their treatment team via our own
medical record and communicate that this person is
having a problem, and then you can go in and see [if]
this person is getting a follow up from the treatment
team the next day, versus kind of just letting them go.”
Combining information from multiple agencies also
enabled team members to identify frequent “fliers” or
“super utilizers” of local justice system and emergency
services. While these individuals had been in contact
with all three MCAT agencies prior to the MCAT pilot,
the information shared across agencies helped team
members to understand the frequency and time lags be-
tween contacts. In turn, this information was used to co-
ordinate and deliver an intervention that may be most
appropriate to an individual’s current circumstances.
Team building
Participants acknowledged that one of the most useful
aspects of the initial MCAT training was the ability for
team members to learn about one another, adopt useful
skills from one another, and build relationships. Team
members were introduced to the philosophies, language,
and procedures of the other agencies during a
seven-week training. As one MCAT stakeholder de-
scribed, “It was apparent that each different agency
needed to be a little more aware of the other agencies in
order to work more closely together.”
Team members expressed that “the training brought
this unit together and I think all the teams are functioning
pretty good.” MCAT members emphasized that being able
to select their teams was an important element of the
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initial implementation of the program: “If we were
assigned teams, we may not have been as successful, but
we got to pick our teams and get along better for it.”
Team members spoke of collegial working relationships
and noted examples of working styles or approaches drift-
ing across team members. For instance, one clinician
complimented his paramedic teammate on subtle changes
in the paramedic’s interactions with PMI, citing the para-
medic’s willingness to adopt attitudes and behaviors more
typical of a clinician than a paramedic. These kind of
scene processing and PMI interaction changes were iden-
tified by other IMPD and IEMS members of the MCAT,
stating that their “mindset was changed because of the
training.”
Discussion
PMI are disproportionately represented in the criminal
justice system and, police are often positioned to be the
first responders in calls for service for PMI in crisis.
Co-response teams have emerged as one potential inter-
vention that could help stem the cycle of criminal justice
involvement among PMI. This study examined the In-
dianapolis MCAT pilot program—a co-responding
police-mental health team aimed at pre-arrest diver-
sion—and identified a number of important barriers and
facilitators to the program’s implementation.
In terms of barriers, ambiguous policies and proce-
dures were difficult for MCAT members to adapt to in
their new roles. Coordination of agencies contributing to
the MCAT program and word-of-mouth efforts made to
advance MCAT’s objectives and roles were not necessar-
ily being heard by agencies directly or indirectly assisting
PMI, which compounded confusion about the program
in general and appeared to translate directly to role am-
biguity among its line members (Department of Health
and Human Services, Victoria, 2012). Developing a sys-
tematic set of procedures and resources may increase
consistency between teams and reduce confusion for
teams trying to decide where to respond, what actions to
take, and how to follow up (Department of Health and
Human Services, Victoria, 2012). After implementation,
policies can and should be reevaluated to determine
whether or not they are in line with the program’s ultim-
ate mission or goal. Indeed, leadership acknowledged
that some initial flexibility is advisable but that more
formalization and guidance is necessary as operations
evolve over time. Findings suggest that first responders
value the structure associated with clear policies and
procedures as a way to effectively carry out job tasks, re-
duce concerns related to liability, as well as legitimize
their work (Kinnaird, 2002).
Stigma emerged as a noteworthy barrier to implemen-
tation and was part of a larger issue related to role clar-
ity; this is consistent with the extant literature which
suggests that on co-response teams roles, missions, and
beliefs do not always align (Scott, 2000; Steadman et al.,
2000; Hartford et al., 2006; Saunders & Marchik, 2007;
Kisely et al., 2010; Rosenbaum, 2010; Department of
Health and Human Services, Victoria, 2012; Kirst et al.,
2015). Police in particular felt ostracized by fellow first
responders. Indeed, police culture characterized by mas-
culinity and solidarity may be partially to blame for this
stigma (Workman-Stark, 2017). Once co-response team
members have been identified and assigned, efforts must
be made to support and retain these members through
in-service and off-service training. Stigma between po-
lice officers can be reduced through cultivating a collab-
orative approach to police work that places higher value
on diverse officer skill sets and rewards officers who vol-
unteer to participate in innovative or otherwise
non-traditional operations, such as co-response teams
(Workman-Stark, 2017).
Despite these barriers, the findings offer several im-
portant facilitators to build out and implement first-re-
sponder co-response teams. For example, information
sharing (or “triangulation”) was one of the most salient
facilitators to both the MCAT in this study and other
co-response teams (Lamb et al., 1995; Scott, 2000; Stead-
man et al., 2000; Ratansi, 2004; Baess, 2005; Hartford et
al., 2006; Saunders & Marchik, 2007; Kisely et al., 2010;
Rosenbaum, 2010; Department of Health and Human
Services, Victoria, 2012; Kirst et al., 2015). New forms of
data and lenses by which these data could be interpreted
appeared to serve as a reinforcement mechanism that
enabled team members to understand PMI experiences,
track progress, and to try new solutions or those that
were perceived to have previously worked. These find-
ings highlight the importance of validating team mem-
bers’ role by equipping them with the tools necessary for
successful job performance, thus increasing self-efficacy.
Research indicates high levels of self-efficacy among first
responders not only improves their mental health but
also increases job satisfaction related to helping others
through their work (Pietrantoni & Prati, 2008). Future
implementations should seek to develop and coordinate
data sharing agreements among co-response team agen-
cies well before implementation. Furthermore, future in-
terventions may wish to move beyond agencies involved
in a co-response team and pursue opportunities to share
or remotely access non-private justice, health, and treat-
ment system information across geographic areas.
Study findings also highlight the underlying need for
increased funding and resource allocation for outpatient
mental health treatment options. Indeed, according to
Mental Health America, 24% of adults in Indiana have
unmet mental health needs, largely due to lack of insur-
ance as well as lack of various treatment types and pro-
viders (Mental Health America, n.d.). The difficulties
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presented by a lack of treatment services for program
consumers surfaced multiple times throughout the re-
search literature on co-response teams (Lamb et al.,
1995; Scott, 2000; Steadman et al., 2000; Steadman et al.,
2001; Ratansi, 2004; Baess, 2005;Hartford et al., 2006;
Saunders & Marchik, 2007; Kisely et al., 2010; Rosen-
baum, 2010; Department of Health and Human Services,
Victoria, 2012; Kirst et al., 2015), and unfortunately this
barrier existed for the MCAT as well. An increase in
mental health services would facilitate co-response team
success as clients are referred to and receive treatment.
Future co-response team pilots may wish to integrate
time and resources into inventorying available mental
health service providers and providers’ entry points well
before implementation.
Despite these findings and contributions to the literature
this study is not without limitations. First, this was largely a
formative evaluation in which we examined the MCAT as a
proof-of-concept; that is, can the intervention be imple-
mented and what are some of the barriers and facilitators
towards successful delivery of services. As such this study
did not examine outcomes or have a basis of comparison to
standard responses or interventions serving similar resi-
dents. Second, despite some overlap with the available re-
search literature, key themes identified in this study may be
a function of the local setting. Future multisite research that
enables comparisons of first responder and post-response
co-response teams as well as the relative effect of these
teams in jurisdictions with and without well-coordinated
mental health service providers are needed. Third, although
we collected data from all of the MCAT team members
and stakeholders, the collection was cross-sectional. Thus,
we could not examine changes in attitudes or perceptions
over time. Ideally future co-response team research should
integrate pre and post surveys to examine changes in atti-
tudes toward PMI and agency collaboration. These data
collection would help to move the co-response literature
toward more generalizable findings that can help to pin-
point problematic implementation issues and test efforts to
mitigate their effect on operations.
Conclusion
Despite limitations, the current study provides a critical
foundation for the implementation of police mental
health co-response teams. Cultural and systematic fac-
tors that may temper the anticipated benefits of
co-response teams should be understood prior to team
creation and be used to guide implementation. One key
conclusion to take away from this research is the need
for collective support for co-response teams from all in-
volved agencies as well as the general community. As
co-response team members transition into their new
roles and take on new responsibilities, it is critical they
have the tools and resources necessary to effectively
impact their community and help those living with men-
tal illness. The current study supplements the limited
co-response literature that exists by further identifying
barriers and facilitators to co-response team implemen-
tation. The lessons learned from this study can be used
to inform future implementation efforts in order to posi-
tively engage PMI and divert them from the criminal
justice system into needed services. Additionally, other
types of cross-agency collaborations may benefit from
the findings of this study as police join with other spe-
cialists to divert those in need of treatment from the
criminal justice system. For example, recent national ef-
forts between police and treatment providers to divert
persons with substance use-related emergencies into re-
covery services may encounter similar barriers and facili-
tators to cooperation.
Appendix 1
MCAT Semi-Structured Focus Group Protocol
1. First we want to get your general impressions of
how MCAT is going
a. So, how are things going?
b. What are your initial perceptions on the
usefulness of the MCAT program?
c. Have you come across anything that you
weren’t expecting or weren’t fully prepared for?
d. How would you describe the roles
[responsibilities] of each person on the MCAT
team?
[PROBE: Would you say that these roles were
pre-determined or something that’s developed
while working together?
2. Next we want to talk about the decision-making
process
a. Can you describe what a “typical” MCAT
dispatch process looks like so far?
[NOTE: if they cannot describe typical dispatch,
follow up with what looks similar across calls].
b. Were decision-making protocols ever discussed
in training or MCAT development?
[PROBE: If so, describe].
c. Do you feel like everyone contributes to
decisions made at the scene or is there a
designated leader?
d. Have you had any challenges related to decision
making?
3. Next we want to discuss any barriers and
facilitators to the M-CAT
a. What have you found to be a barrier or challenge
to responding successfully to M-CAT runs?
b. Are there any specific resources that M-CAT
needs to be successful?
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c. Is there anything specific that is a barrier
towards successfully doing your job once you
arrive on the scene?
d. What have you found particularly helpful in
responding successful to M-CAT runs?
[PROBE: Examples might be communication,
training, technology].
e. Thinking about other areas that might
implement the M-CAT, is there anything you
think should be a “best practice” or a “standard
procedure”?
4. Finally we want to discuss what happens after an
MCAT run
a. What typically happens to someone after an
MCAT involvement?
[PROBE: Does someone follow up? Always or just
in some circumstances?]
IF YES: What does follow-up look like? Describe
this
b. What do you think the main benefit is to being
a person who has a response from the MCAT
versus a traditional police response?
c. Do you think that persons who involved in
MCAT runs are less likely to be arrested than
those who are involved in a traditional police
response?
[PROBE: Why or why not?]
d. Is there an MCAT debrief session?
IF YES: do these inform future runs?
Appendix 2
MCAT Semi-Structured Interview Protocol
1. First, could you describe the need that the M-CAT
was created to address?
2. From your understanding, could you provide a brief
overview of how the program was coordinated?
a. How did stakeholders coordinate/make
decisions?
b. What was successful or unsuccessful in this?
3. What barriers to starting the M-CAT program
existed?
4. What actions, if any, were taken to overcome those
barriers?
a. Do you think they were successful?
5. Is there anything you would have done differently
to launch M-CAT knowing what you know now?
Post-Launch
6. How do you think the M-CAT program is coming
along?
a. In your perception, is it successful?
7. Are there any barriers to a successful MCAT
program that have come up since the launch?
8. Do you perceive any necessary course-corrections
that the leadership can implement?
a. Do you perceive anything that works
particularly well that should be maintained?
b. How would you do this?
9. How do you think the MCAT is perceived by
external groups?
10. How do you think the MCAT is perceived generally
in your organization?
11. Do you think public or internal perception impacts
the ability for MCAT to succeed?
12. For anyone wanting to implement a similar model,
what would you say the key components of a
successful M-CAT are in terms of:
a. Multi-agency, multi-organizational coordination
b. The Team
c. Equipment
d. Support for ongoing success
e. Other?
13. Is there anything else you would want future
implementers of MCAT programs to know?
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